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Abstract: 
We model the motives for residents of a country to hold foreign assets, including the 
precautionary motive that has been omitted from much previous literature as intractable. Our 
model captures many of the principal insights from the existing specialized literature on the 
precautionary motive, deriving a convenient formula for the economy’s target value of assets. 
The target is the level of assets that balances impatience, prudence, risk, intertemporal 
substitution, and the rate of return. We use the model to shed light on two topical questions: 
The “upstream” flows of capital from developing countries to advanced countries, and the 
long-run impact of resorbing global financial imbalances. 
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The remarkable recent accumulation of foreign reserves in emerging economies has
captured attention from academics, policymakers, and ﬁnancial markets, partly
because reserve accumulation seems to have played a role in the development
of global ﬁnancial imbalances. A distinct (but probably related) puzzle is that
national saving rates of fast-growing emerging economies have been rising over
time,
1 leading to surprising “upstream” ﬂows of capital from developing to rich
countries. The corresponding accumulation of foreign assets in “sovereign wealth
funds” has begun to attract scrutiny as those funds have emerged as prominent
actors in global capital markets.
A popular interpretation of all these trends is that they reﬂect precautionary
saving against the risks associated with economic globalization.
2
Such an interpretation raises several questions. What are the main deter-
minants of the demand for external assets? What are the welfare beneﬁts of
international integration, if it leads developing countries to export rather than
import capital? How persistent will the recent increase in developing countries’
demand for foreign assets prove to be? How does the precautionary motive for
accumulating such assets interact with other motives?
This paper introduces a tractable model that can be used to analyze these
questions and others. The model is a small-open-macroeconomy version of the
model of individual precautionary saving developed by Carroll (2009a), based
on Toche (2005) (see also Sargent and Ljunqvist (2000)). The model permits us
to characterize the dynamics of foreign asset accumulation with phase diagrams
that should be readily understandable to anyone familiar with the benchmark
Ramsey model of economic growth, and to derive closed-form expressions that
relate the target level of net foreign assets to fundamental determinants like
the degree of risk, the time preference rate, and expected productivity growth.
The model’s structure is simple enough to permit straightforward calculations
of welfare-equivalent tradeoﬀs between growth, social insurance generosity, and
risk.
1For evidence of causality from growth to saving, see Carroll and Weil (1994); Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel,
and Servén (2000); Attanasio, Picci, and Scorcu (2000); Hausmann and Rodrik (2005); Gourinchas and Jeanne
(2007).
2“The East Asian countries that constitute the class of ’97—the countries that learned the lessons of
instability the hard way in the crises that began that year—have boosted their reserves in part because they
want to make sure that they won’t need to borrow from the IMF again. Others, who saw their neighbors suﬀer,
came to the same conclusion—it is imperative to have enough reserves to withstand the worst of the world’s
economic vicissitudes.” (Stiglitz, 2006, p. 248)
seminar participants at George Washington University, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, and the
Bank of Canada for their comments, Patrick Toche for comments on an earlier draft, and Matthew White for
excellent research assistance.
2We then present two applications of our framework. First, we look at what the
model says about the puzzling relation between economic growth and interna-
tional capital ﬂows (especially the fact that fast-growing developing countries
tend to export capital). We show that this puzzle can be explained in our
framework if the bargain that countries make when they embark on a path
of rapid development involves not only a pickup in productivity growth but
also an increase in the degree of idiosyncratic risk borne by individuals (like
unemployment spells that result in substantial lost wages). Second, we use a two-
country version of the model to investigate the long-term impact on the United
States and the rest of the world if the recent global ﬁnancial imbalances were
to be resorbed by a fall in non-U.S. savings (as some analysts have advocated).
Our model implies that a decrease in the desired level of wealth in the rest of the
world has a substantial negative impact on the global capital stock as well as the
U.S. (and global) real wage.
A central purpose of the paper is to distill the main insights of the complex
literature that interprets capital ﬂows through the lens of the precautionary
motive.
3 The older literature on the intertemporal approach to the current
account simply ignores precautionary behavior by considering a linear-quadratic
formulation of the consumption-saving problem (see Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995)
for a review). An exception is Ghosh and Ostry (1997), who look at the im-
plications of precautionary motives for the current account balance of advanced
economies. They use a model with aggregate income shocks in which the domestic
consumer has constant absolute risk aversion utility (an assumption that makes
the model solvable in closed form but also implies rather special properties for
the dynamics of foreign assets).
More recently, one strand of the intertemporal literature looks at the eﬀects of
aggregate risk on domestic precautionary wealth. For example, Durdu, Mendoza,
and Terrones (2007) present some estimates of the optimal level of precautionary
wealth accumulated by a small open economy in response to business cycle
volatility, ﬁnancial globalization, and the risk of a sudden stop. They conclude
that these risks are plausible explanations of the observed surge in reserves in
emerging market countries.
4 Arbatli (2008) argues that precautionary motives
associated with the possibility of sudden stops in credit can explain the dynamics
of the current account in emerging economy business cycles. Fogli and Perri
(2006) instead take the perspective of the U.S. and argue that the decrease in
its saving rate can be explained partly by the moderation in the volatility of its
3Precautionary accumulation is not the only interpretation of recent developments in international capital
ﬂows. For example, Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008) suggest that those ﬂows have been driven by
countries’ supply of (rather than demand for) assets.
4In contrast, Jeanne (2007) and Jeanne and Rancière (2008) ﬁnd that it is diﬃcult to explain the build-up
in emerging markets reserves as insurance against the risk of sudden stop.
3business cycle.
Closer to our paper are the contributions that examine the impact of idiosyn-
cratic risk on saving behavior. Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2007)m o d e l
the determination of capital ﬂows in a closed world in which economies diﬀer
by their level of ﬁnancial development (market completeness). They ﬁnd that
international ﬁnancial integration can lead to the accumulation of a large level of
net and gross liabilities by the more ﬁnancially advanced region. Sandri (2008)
presents a model in which growth acceleration in a developing country causes a
larger increase in saving than in investment because capital market imperfections
induce entrepreneurs not only to self-ﬁnance investment but also to accumulate
precautionary wealth outside their business enterprise.
Several of our analytical results resonate with themes developed, or touched
upon, in those papers (in particular, the importance of domestic ﬁnancial de-
velopment or social insurance for international capital ﬂows). The main com-
parative advantages of our analysis are two. First, the insights are reﬂected
in tractable analytical formulas. The impact of key variables can be analyzed
using a simple diagram or closed-form expressions—although (as usual) analysis
of transitional dynamics requires numerical solution tools (which we provide).
Second, our model of prudent (Kimball (1990)) intertemporal choice is integrated
with a standard neoclassical treatment of production (Cobb Douglas with labor
augmenting productivity growth), so that the familiar Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans
framework can be viewed as the perfect-insurance special case of our model. This
allows us analyze the link between economic development and capital ﬂows in a
way that is directly comparable to the corresponding analysis in the standard
model.
5
2 Model
We consider a small open economy whose population and productivity grow at
constant rates. A resident of this economy accumulates precautionary wealth in
order to insure against the risk of unemployment, which results in complete and
permanent destruction of the individual’s human capital.
6,7 The saving decisions
of our individuals aggregate to produce “net foreign assets” for the economy as a
5The models of Fogli and Perri (2006) and Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2007) do not incorporate
growth. The model of Sandri (2008) has economic growth in the transition dynamics toward a long-run steady
state with no growth. By contrast, our model allows one to look at the impact of diﬀerent long-run productivity
growth rates.
6Below, we explore the consequenses of introducing partial or complete insurance against unemployment
risk.
7For the sovereign wealth fund interpretation of our model, this risk should be interpreted as reﬂecting
a radical reduction in the purchasing power of the country’s exports, e.g. a commodity price collapse for a
commodity-based exporter.
4whole.
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2.1 Macroeconomic Assumptions
Domestic output is produced according to the usual Cobb-Douglas function:
P P P t = K K K
α
t (ztL L Lt)
1−α, (1)
where K K Kt is domestic capital and L L Lt is the supply of domestic labor. The
productivity of labor increases by a constant factor G in every period,
zt+1 = Gzt.
Capital and labor are supplied in perfectly competitive markets. Capital is
perfectly mobile internationally, so that the marginal return to capital is the
same as in the rest of the world,
  + α
P P P t
K K Kt
= R, (2)
where the Hebrew letter daleth   ≡ (1 − δ) is the proportion of capital that
remains undepreciated after production, and R is the worldwide constant risk-
free interest factor. Thus, the capital-to-output ratio is constant and equal to
K K K
P P P
=
α
R −  
. (3)
Labor is supplied by domestic workers. Each worker is part of a ‘generation’
born at the same date, and every new generation is larger by the factor Ξ than
the newborn generation in the previous period. If we normalize to 1 the size of
the generation born at t =0 , the generation born at t will be of size Ξt.
An individual’s life has three phases: Employment, followed by unemployment,
which terminates in death. Transitions to unemployment and to death follow
Poisson processes with constant arrival rates. The probability that an employed
worker will become unemployed is   (while the probability of remaining employed
is denoted as the cancellation of unemployment,     ≡ 1 −  ). The probability
that an unemployed individual dies before the next period is D; the probability
of survival is denoted by the cancellation of death,   D ≡ 1 − D. (Individuals
are permitted to die only after they have become unemployed.) The employed
population, E, and the unemployed population, U thus satisfy the dynamic
equations,
Et −E t−1 =Ξ
t −  Et−1
Ut −U t−1 =  Et−1 − DUt−1.
8Our ﬁrst appendix contains a list of our model’s parameters and variables and their deﬁnitions, to aid the
reader in keeping track.
5The ﬁrst equation says that the net increase in the employed population is equal
to the size of the newborn generation minus the ﬂow of previously employed
workers going to unemployment. The second says that the net increase in the
unemployed population is equal to the number of newly unemployed workers
minus the previously unemployed workers who exit life. It follows that the
employed and unemployed populations are respectively given by
Et =
Ξt+1
Ξ −   
Ut =
 Ξt+1
(Ξ −  D)(Ξ −   )
.
Total labor supply is the number of workers times the average labor supply per
worker,
L L Lt = Et . (4)
It then follows from (1)a n d( 3) that in the balanced growth equilibrium capital
and output grow by the same factor ΞG in every period. Finally, the real wage
is equal to the marginal product of labor,
Wt =( 1− α)
P P P t
L L Lt
,
which grows by the factor G in every period.
Perfect capital mobility means that residents and non-residents can hold do-
mestic capital, and can hold foreign assets or issue foreign liabilities. The main
variable of interest is N N Nt, the aggregate net foreign assets of the economy at
the end of period t. As a matter of accounting, the country’s net foreign asset
position is equal to the diﬀerence between the value of its total wealth and the
value of domestic physical capital,
N N Nt =
S S St+1
R
−K K Kt+1, (5)
whereS S St+1/R is the present discounted value at the end of period t of next period’s
total wealth (see Appendix A.2 for the basic national accounting relationships in
this economy). The dynamics of S S St are determined by the consumption/saving
choices of individuals, to which we now turn.
62.2 The Microeconomic Consumer’s Problem
Using lower-case variables for individuals, the period-t budget constraint relates
current consumption c c c to current labor income and current and future wealth s s s,
9
s s st+1
R
+c c ct = s s st +
labor income       
ξt tWt , (6)
where ξ is a dummy variable indicating the consumer’s employment state. Ev-
eryone in this economy is either employed (state ‘e’), in which case ξ =1 ,o r
unemployed (state ‘u’), in which case ξ =0 , so that for unemployed individuals
labor income is zero.
We assume that the labor productivity   of each individual worker who remains
employed grows by a factor X every period because of increasing eXperience,
 t = X
t 0, (7)
where  0 is the labor supply of a newborn individual. X can be interpreted as the
factor that governs the rate at which an individual’s work skills improve, perhaps
as a result of human capital accumulation, whereas G is the factor by which
productivity grows in the economy as a whole, perhaps due to societal knowledge
accumulation and technological advance (Mankiw (1995)). This means that for
a consumer who remains employed, labor income will grow by factor
Γ ≡ GX.
Following Toche (2005), unemployment means a complete and permanent de-
struction of the individual’s human wealth: Once a person becomes unemployed,
that person can never become employed again. Thus, unemployment could also
be interpreted as retirement (we calibrate the model so that the average length
of the working life is forty years). Employed consumers face a constant risk   of
becoming unemployed regardless of their age.
Consumers have a CRRA felicity function u(•)=•1−ρ/(1 − ρ) and discount
future utility geometrically by β per period. We assume that unemployed workers
have access to life insurance àl aBlanchard (1985) and can convert their wealth
into annuities. As shown in the appendix, the solution to the unemployed
consumer’s optimization problem is
c c c
u
t = κ
us s s
u
t, (8)
where the u superscript now signiﬁes the consumer’s (un)employment status,
and κu, the marginal propensity to consume for the perfect foresight unemployed
9A brief terminological rant: We generally call s s s ‘wealth’ rather than ‘savings’ because of the confusion
induced by the words ‘saving’ and ‘savings’; saving is a behavior (a ﬂow; a choice not to spend some portion of
current income) while savings is a stock of resources that result from past saving ﬂows. Authors in this literature
frequently misapply the stock word savings for the ﬂow word saving or vice versa, so we prefer to use the word
‘wealth’ which unambiguously denotes a stock.
7consumer, is given by
κ
u =1 −
(βR)1/ρ  D
R
. (9)
We assume κu > 0, which is necessary for the unemployed consumer’s problem
to have a well-deﬁned solution.
Following Carroll (2009b), it will be useful to deﬁne a ‘growth patience factor’:
Þ Þ ÞΓ =
(βR)1/ρ
Γ
, (10)
which is the factor by which ce would grow in the perfect foresight version of
the model with labor income growth factor Γ. We will assume that the growth
patience factor Þ Þ ÞΓ is less than one
Þ Þ ÞΓ < 1. (11)
This condition—which Carroll (2009b) dubs the ‘perfect foresight growth im-
patience condition’ (PF-GIC)—ensures that a consumer facing no uncertainty
is suﬃciently impatient that his wealth-to-permanent-income ratio will fall over
time.
The Euler equation for an employed worker is,
(c c c
e
t)
−ρ = βR
 
   (c c c
e
t+1)
−ρ +  (c c c
u
t+1)
−ρ 
.
Now deﬁne nonbold variables as the boldface equivalent divided by the level of
permanent labor income for an employed consumer, e.g. ce
t = c c ce
t/(Wt t),a n d
rewrite the consumption Euler equation as
(Þ Þ ÞΓc
e
t)
−ρ =    (c
e
t+1)
−ρ +  (c
u
t+1)
−ρ. (12)
The budget constraint of an employed worker can be written, in normalized
form, as
s
e
t+1 =( R/Γ)(s
e
t − c
e
t +1 ). (13)
Using this equation and cu
t+1 = κuse
t+1 to substitute out cu
t+1 from (12) (since
a worker who becomes unemployed in period t +1starts with wealth se
t+1), we
have
c
e
t+1 = Þ Þ ÞΓ   
1/ρc
e
t
 
1 −  
 
Þ Þ ÞΓ
κu
ce
t
R/Γ(se
t − ce
t +1 )
 ρ −1/ρ
. (14)
Equations (13)a n d( 14) characterize the dynamics for the pair of variables
(se
t,c e
t). It is possible to show (see the appendix) that those dynamics are saddle-
point stable, and that the ratio of wealth to income, se
t, converges toward a
positive limit, the target wealth-to-income ratio, denoted by ˇ s. Figure 1 presents
the phase diagram.
8We now determine the long-run target wealth-to-income ratio. Setting ce
t+1 =
ce
t =ˇ c and cu
t+1 = κˇ s in equation (12) gives
ˇ c = κ
u
 
1+
Þ Þ Þ
−ρ
Γ − 1
 
 1/ρ
ˇ s, (15)
and setting se
t+1 = se
t =ˇ s and ce
t =ˇ c in equation (13) gives,
(Γ/R − 1) ˇ s =1− ˇ c. (16)
Eliminating ˇ c between (15)a n d( 16) then gives an explicit formula for the target
wealth-to-income ratio,
ˇ s =
 
Γ
R
− 1+κ
u
 
1+
Þ Þ Þ
−ρ
Γ − 1
 
 1/ρ −1
. (17)
Here is the intuition behind the target wealth ratio: On the one hand, consumers
are growth-impatient. This prevents their wealth-to-income ratio from heading
oﬀ to inﬁnity. On the other hand, consumers have a precautionary motive
that intensiﬁes more and more as the level of wealth gets lower and lower.
At some point the precautionary motive gets strong enough to counterbalance
impatience. The point where impatience matches prudence deﬁnes the target
wealth-to-income ratio.
Expression (17) encapsulates several of the key economic eﬀects captured by
the model. The human wealth eﬀect of growth is captured by the Γ and Þ Þ ÞΓ terms.
Increasing Γ will decrease the growth patience factor Þ Þ ÞΓ and therefore reduce the
target level of wealth. An increase in the worker’s patience (an increase in β and
in the growth patience factor Þ Þ ÞΓ) boosts the target level of wealth. Finally, an
increase in unemployment risk increases the target level of precautionary wealth.
10
Those comparative statics results can be summarized as
∂ˇ s
∂ 
> 0, (18)
∂ˇ s
∂β
> 0,
∂ˇ s
∂Γ
< 0.
The response of the target asset ratio to the risk aversion parameter ρ is less
straightforward. On the one hand, higher risk aversion enhances the demand
for precautionary reserves. On the other hand, it also implies that consumption
is less elastic intertemporally. The response of ˇ s to R is also ambiguous, which
10An increase in  also decreases the worker’s human wealth, because a greater probability of becoming
unemployed means a greater risk of having zero income. See Carroll and Toche (2009) for a careful analysis of
the case of a human-wealth-preserving spread in risk.
9is unsurprising given that even in the deterministic model the relation between
interest rates and spending can be either positive or negative depending on the
relative sizes of the income and subsititution eﬀects. In our model it is possible
to show that if ρ ≤ 1, then the target level the wealth-to-income ratio increases
with the interest rate. For the usual case where ρ>1, however, the sign of the
response of ˇ s to R could be positive or negative.
2.3 Foreign Assets
We now add up the individuals’ balance sheets to ﬁnd the country’s aggregate net
foreign assets. We ﬁrst present a general formula that aggregates the resources
of all generations of employed and unemployed workers. We then specialize
this formula under two assumptions about the initial ‘stake’ of newborns in the
economy. (We use ‘stake’ to designate a transfer received by newborns). In the
model without stakes, newborns do not receive any transfer and must accumulate
wealth through their own frugality. The microeconomic consumer’s problem,
therefore, is the one we have described in the previous section. In the model with
stakes, newborns receive a transfer that puts their wealth-to-income ratio at par
with the rest of the population. The main advantage of the model with stakes is
that it is more tractable and yields a closed-form expression for the ratio of net
foreign assets to GDP.
2.3.1 Aggregating Individual Wealths
First, let us focus on the wealth of the employed households. Simple computations
(reported in the appendix) show that the ratio of employed workers’ wealth to
output is given by
S
e
t =
S S Se
t
P P P t
=( 1 − α)
⎛
⎜
⎝1 −
   X
Ξ     
≡Λ
⎞
⎟
⎠
+∞  
n=0
Λ
ns
e
t,t−n, (19)
where se
t,t−n is the wealth-to-income ratio at t of the workers born at t−n,a n dΛ
is the factor by which the share of a generation in total labor supply shrinks every
period. Equation (19), thus, says that the ratio of workers’ wealth to output is the
average of the individual wealth-to-labor-income ratios over the past generations,
weighted by the share of each generation in total labor supply and by the share
of labor income in total output (1 − α).
Second, let us consider the wealth of the unemployed households (managed by
the Blanchardian life insurance company). The aggregate wealth of unemployed
10households satisﬁes the dynamic equation,
S S S
u
t+1 = R(S S S
u
t −C C C
u
t)+ S S S
e
t+1,
where the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side reﬂects the accumulation of wealth
by the unemployed households, and the second term is the wealth of the newly-
unemployed households. The unemployed households consume a constant frac-
tion of their wealth, C C Cu
t = κuS S Su
t, so that the equation above can be rewritten,
S S S
u
t+1 = R(1 − κ
u)S S S
u
t +  S S S
e
t+1. (20)
This equation fully characterizes the dynamics of the unemployed households’
wealth ratio for a given path for the employed workers’ wealth ratio.
Now we consider a steady state in which the wealth of the employed is a
constant fraction of GDP, Se = S S Se/P P P. Then equation (20)a n dP P P t+1/P P P t =
ΞG imply that the ratio of wealth to GDP is also constant for unemployed
households,
11
S S Su
P P P
=
 ΞG
ΞG −  D(βR)1/ρ
S S Se
P P P
. (21)
The ratio of net foreign assets to GDP is obtained by subtracting domestic
capital from domestic wealth. Using (3), (5), (21), P P P t+1/P P P t =Ξ G,a n dS S St =
S S Se
t +S S Su
t, the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP is given by,
N N N
P P P
=
ΞG
R
 
1+
 ΞG
ΞG −  D(βR)1/ρ
 
S S Se
P P P
− ΞG
 
α
R −  
 
. (22)
This expression gives the country’s ratio of net foreign assets to GDP in terms
of the exogenous parameters and one endogenous variable, the ratio of employed
workers’ wealth to GDP, S S Se/P P P. We now present two ways of endogenizing this
variable.
2.3.2 No Stake
The most natural assumption is that newborns enter the economy with zero
wealth, and must save some of their income to ensure that they do not starve
if they become unemployed. In this case, analysis must be performed using
simulation methods, because households of diﬀerent ages will have diﬀerent ratios
of wealth to income. (With a concave and nonanalytical consumption function,
analytical aggregation cannot be performed.)
In this version of the model, each individual is faced with exactly the same
problem as in section 2.2. Let us denote by se(n) the level of normalized wealth
held at the beginning of period n of the individual’s life in the problem of section
11This expression assumes ΞG > D(βR)1/ρ. Otherwise S S Su
t /P P Pt grows without bound.
112.2. We assume that the individual starts his life with zero wealth, se(0) = 0.
In other words, se(n)n=0,1,2,.. is the optimal time path of the individual’s wealth.
Then we can replace se
t,t−n by se(n) in equation (19),
S
e =
S S Se
P P P
=( 1 − α)(1 − Λ)
+∞  
n=0
Λ
ns
e(n). (23)
The ratio of workers’ wealth to GDP is constant, and can be computed numeri-
cally based on the path se(n)n=0,1,.... Note that this ratio is lower than (1 − α)ˇ s,
since it is a weighted average of (1 − α)se(n), which converge toward (1 − α)ˇ s
from below.
2.3.3 A ‘Stake’ That Yields a Representative Agent
We now consider a version of the model in which an exogenous redistribution
program guarantees that the behavior of employed households can be understood
by analyzing the actions of a “representative employed agent.” This will be
achieved by the introduction of lump-sum transfers that ensure that the newborn
individuals are endowed with the same wealth-to-income ratio that older gener-
ations already hold. This is explicitly not an inheritance, as we have assumed
that individuals have no bequest motive and newborns are unrelated to anyone
in the existing population. Our motivation is largely to make the model more
tractable, rather than to represent an important feature of the real world; hence,
we perform simulations designed to show that the characteristics of the model
with no ‘stake’ are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those of the more
tractable model with a carefully chosen ‘stake.’
The details of the model with stakes are given in the appendix. The transfer
ensures that the workers have the same wealth-to-income ratio at all times. Thus
one can replace se
t,t−n by se
t in equation (19), which gives,
S
e
t =
S S Se
t
P P P t
=( 1− α)s
e
t, (24)
where Se
t follows the same saddle-point dynamics as for a single agent (adjusted
for the transfer).
One can show (see the appendix) that in the long run, se
t converges to
ˇ ˇ s =
 
Γ
R
−
1
2 − Λ
+ κ
u
 
1+
Þ Þ Þ
−ρ
Γ − 1
 
 1/ρ −1
(25)
so that (25) implies a closed-form expression for the ratio of workers’ wealth to
12GDP,
ˇ ˇ S =
S S Se
P P P
=( 1 − α)ˇ ˇ s. (26)
This expression can be plugged into equation (22) to ﬁnd the ratio of net foreign
assets to GDP.
It is interesting to compare formula (25) with the one that we obtained for
an individual in the model without stakes—equation (17). Since Λ < 1 we have
ˇ ˇ s<ˇ s. Thus equations (17)a n d( 25) both predict that the ratio of wealth to
GDP is lower than (1−α)ˇ s, but in the new formula this comes from the fact that
the target wealth-to-income ratio is lowered by the tax, rather than from the fact
that the wealth-to-income ratio is lower for younger workers.
We will show below that the model with stakes provides a good approximation
to the model with no stake. But the model with stakes has several advantages.
First, the transition dynamics can be characterized using equation (26). In the
model without stakes the transition dynamics involve an inﬁnite state space as the
wealth-to-income ratio must be tracked separately for each generation. Second,
the model with stakes gives a closed-form expression for the steady state ratio of
foreign assets to GDP. This makes it possible to study analytically how the ratio
of foreign assets to GDP depends on the exogenous parameters of the model.
With formula (23), by contrast, such a study must rely on numerical simulations.
3 Calibration and Simulation
3.1 Benchmark Calibration and Sensitivity Analysis
Our benchmark calibration is reported in Table 1. The value for the unemploy-
ment probability,  , implies that a newborn worker expects to be employed for
40 years. The value for the probability of death, D, implies that the expected
lifetime of a newly unemployed worker is 20 years.
Table 1
α   Ξ G R β−1 X   ρ D
0.3 0.94 1.01 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.01 0.025 2 0.05
Note: For a reminder of parameter deﬁnitions, see Appendix A.1
The long-run levels of se and ce are given by ˇ s =4 .85 and ˇ c =0 .95.T h e
time paths for Se
t and Ce
t are shown in Figure 2. The convergence to the targets
is relatively rapid. The individual saves more than one third of his income on
average in the ﬁrst ten years of his life, after which his wealth-to-income ratio
already exceeds two thirds of the target level. The wealth-to-income ratio reaches
99 percent of the target level after 40 years (the average duration of employment).
13For the benchmark calibration we ﬁnd: K K K/P P P =3 , N N N/P P P =0 .420 in the model
with no stakes, and N N N/P P P =0 .719 in the model with stakes. These levels have
the right order of magnitude (in view of the fact that most countries have a ratio
of foreign assets to GDP between minus and plus 100 percent of GDP, based on
the database of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)).
Figure 3 shows the sensitivity of N N N/P P P to changes in ρ,  , G and R.T h e
death probability D was adjusted so as to keep the total expected lifetime of an
individual equal to sixty years, i.e.,
 
−1 + D
−1 =6 0 .
First, we observe that the model with stakes gives results that are higher than
the model without stakes, but generally provides a good approximation for the
variation of the net foreign assets with respect to the main parameters.
The variation with respect to the growth rate and the unemployment prob-
ability conﬁrm theoretical properties derived earlier. The foreign assets ratio
decreases with G, as predicted by (18). The ratio of foreign assets to GDP also
increases with the unemployment probability. The ratio of foreign assets to GDP
is increasing with risk aversion ρ. Finally, the foreign asset ratio is increasing
with R, mainly because of the impact of higher interest rates in reducing the
ratio of physical capital to output. The wealth-to-GDP ratio (not reported in
Figure 3) is not very sensitive to R, which is consistent with the ambiguity of the
model prediction if ρ>1.
3.2 Comparison with the Ramsey Model
The Ramsey model corresponds to the particular case where the economy is
populated by one representative inﬁnitely-lived worker (Ξ=1and   =0 ). Thus,
one might expect our model to yield the same results as the Ramsey model in
the limiting case as population growth and unemployment risk go to zero (Ξ and
  → 0).
In fact this is not the case. The predictions of our model for net foreign assets
and capital ﬂows exhibit a discontinuity at   =0 . To see this, note that taking
the limit of equation (17) gives
lim
→0
ˇ s =0 ,
so that the ratio of total domestic wealth to GDP goes to zero as the risk of
14unemployment becomes vanishingly small,
12
lim
→0
S S Se
P P P
=0 ,
implying that the ratio of foreign assets to GDP is equal to minus the ratio of
capital to output,
lim
→0
N N N
P P P
= −
K K K
P P P
. (27)
The Ramsey model does not yield the same formula. If the unemployment risk
is strictly equal to zero (  =0 ), we must assume Γ < R for the intertemporal
income of the worker to be well-deﬁned and ﬁnite.
13 In this case income growth is
the same at the individual level and at the aggregate level. We can also assume,
without loss of generality, that X =1 ,s ot h a tΓ=G. Then it is possible to show
that the asymptotic ratio of total net foreign assets to GDP is given by,
lim
t→+∞
N N Nt
P P P t
= −
K K K
P P P
−
1 − α
1 − G/R
. (28)
(see the appendix).
Comparing (27) with (28) shows that the ratio of foreign assets to GDP is
smaller in the Ramsey model. In fact, it is much smaller for plausible calibrations
of the model. The ratio of gross foreign liabilities to GDP implied by the Ramsey
model is close to 70 if R =1 .04 and G =1 .03, and goes to inﬁnity as G converges
to R from below. The growth impatience condition, which is necessary for the
workers to have a ﬁnite target for their wealth to income ratio when they are
vulnerable to unemployment, makes the inﬁnitely-lived Ramsey consumer willing
to borrow a lot against his future income.
The intuition for the discontinuity is that a consumer with CRRA utility will
never allow wealth to fall to zero if there is a possibility of becoming permanently
unemployed, because unemployment with zero wealth yields an inﬁnitely negative
level of utility (if ρ>1). This is the reﬂection, in the international macroeco-
nomic context, of a result long understood in the precautionary saving literature:
Perfect foresight solutions are not robust to the introduction of uninsurable
noncapital income shocks, even if those shocks occur with low probability.
14
12This results from the fact that se(n) ≤ ˇ s converges to zero for all n. In the model with stakes this results
from equation (25).
13Note that this condition is not satisﬁed by the benchmark calibration in Table 1.
14Another interpretation is that the precautionary motive acts as a form of self-imposed liquidity constraint;
see Carroll (2009b) for a formal proof of the equivalency, in the limit, of precautionary saving and liquidity
constraints.
153.3 Social Insurance
The model assumes that the income of an unemployed worker falls to zero. This
is a reasonable assumption for a country in which unemployed and retired workers
receive no social transfer (i.e., in which there are no unemployment beneﬁts
and the retirement system is entirely based on capitalization). However, many
countries have such transfers, and it is interesting to see their impact on foreign
asset accumulation in our model. We consider now the consequences if the
government creates a balanced-budget partial ‘unemployment insurance’ system.
Our deﬁnition of partial insurance starts by assuming that the ‘true’ labor
income process is the one speciﬁed above, but the government interferes with
this process by transferring to the workers who become unemployed in period
t a multiple ς of the labor income that they would have received if they had
remained employed. The social insurance of our model could be interpreted as
an unemployment beneﬁt or as a pay-as-you-go retirement beneﬁt.
The wealth of a newly-unemployed worker now includes the payment from the
insurance scheme, so that equation (8) becomes:
c c c
u
t = κ
u(s s s
u
t + ςWt t)=κ
u(s
u
t + ς)Wt t.
We introduce social insurance in the model with stakes.
15 As shown in the
appendix, one can compute the target wealth-to-GDP ratio as
` ˇ s(ς)=
 
1 − ς
 
 X
Ξ
+ κ
u
 
1+
Þ Þ Þ
−ρ
Γ − 1
 
 1/ρ  
ˇ ˇ s, (29)
where ˇ ˇ s is the asset ratio without insurance, given by (25). The target wealth-
to-income ratio is (linearly) decreasing with ς, as insurance provides a substitute
to precautionary wealth. The formula for N N N/P P P remains (22), with the ratio of
workers’ wealth to GDP given by,
S S Se
P P P
=( 1− α)` ˇ s(ς). (30)
Figure 4 shows how the ratio of foreign assets to GDP, N N N/P P P, varies with ς.T h e
ratio decreases from 0.72 when there is no insurance to negative values when ς
exceeds 1 year of the worker’s wage. The desired level of foreign assets is thus
quite sensitive to the level of social insurance.
15Introducing social insurance in the model without stakes raises no conceptual problems, but does not yield
a closed-form solution.
164 Applications
Although the model is very stylized, plausible calibrations can predict ratios of
foreign assets to GDP that are close to the levels observed in the real world.
16 This
section illustrates how our framework can be applied by looking at two questions
that have been discussed in recent policy debates and academic research: The
relationship between economic development and capital ﬂows, and the long-run
consequences of resorbing global imbalances.
4.1 Economic Development and Capital Flows
Many observers have noted the paradox that international ﬂows of capital have
recently been going “upstream” from developing countries (especially in Asia and
most notably China) to the United States. The case of China, which has caused
so much consternation recently, is merely the latest and largest example of a long-
established pattern: Over long time periods and in large samples of developing
countries, the countries that grow at a higher rate tend to export more capital
(see the evidence cited in footnote 1), a fact that is diﬃcult to reconcile with
the standard neoclassical model of growth (Carroll, Overland, and Weil (2000);
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007); Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian (2007); Sandri
(2008)). Can our model shed light on this puzzle?
4.1.1 Transitions
In this section we look at the correlation between economic growth and capital
ﬂows in a given country over time. We assume that the small open economy
enjoys an economic “take-oﬀ,” deﬁned as a permanent increase in the growth rate
of productivity. However, the rate of growth is not the only thing that increases
at the time of the transition: Idiosyncratic unemployment risk rises too. An
increase in idiosyncratic risk has been observed in many transition countries as
they adopt market systems, a development that has not been associated, in most
countries, with a corresponding increase in social insurance. In particular, the
rise in idiosyncratic risk has been ﬁngered as a reason for the very high saving
rate in China (see, e.g., Chamon and Prasad (2008) and the references therein).
More formally, we assume that the economy starts from a steady state with
constant levels for the productivity growth rate and the unemployment proba-
bility, Gb and  b. At time 0, those variables unexpectedly jump to higher levels,
Ga > Gb and  a >  b. The subscripts b and a respectively stand for “before”
16This fact obviously does not constitute a test of the model (which would go beyond the scope of this paper),
but it suggests that the quantitative implications of the model cannot be dismissed prima facie as irrelevant.
17and “after” the transition. The death probability is adjusted so as to keep the
expected lifetime of an individual equal to 60 years.
Note that in order to beneﬁt the domestic population, the transition must
strictly increase the expected present value of an individual’s labor income, given
by
+∞  
n=0
R
−n
   
n t+nWt+n =
R
R − GX   
 tWt.
Thus one must have,
Ga   a > Gb   b. (31)
The increase in the idiosyncratic risk, in other words, should not be so large
relative to the increase in the growth rate as to decrease workers’ expected present
value of labor income.
We consider the model with stakes, so that the transition dynamics for ag-
gregate wealth can be derived from those for the representative agent. There is
no social insurance. The appendix explains how the path of the main relevant
variable can be computed. We are interested in whether capital tends to ﬂow in
or out of the country when the transition occurs.
For the sake of the simulation, we assume that the growth rate increases from
2 percent to 6 percent in the transition, whereas the unemployment probability
increases from 2 percent to 3 percent (Gb =1 .02,  b =0 .02,a n dGa =1 .06,
 a =0 .03). The other parameters remain calibrated as in Table 1.
17 Note
that condition (31) is satisﬁed: indeed, the economic transition multiplies the
expected present value of individual labor income by a factor 20. If the risk
of unemployment did not increase with the transition, the expected net present
value of labor income would become inﬁnite.
Figure 5 shows the time paths for the growth rate, the ratio of net foreign assets
to GDP and the ratio of capital outﬂows to GDP, with and without the increase
in unemployment risk. Note that if unemployment risk increases, the growth
rate takes time to converge to its new higher level because the rate of labor
participation decreases over time, which dampens the acceleration of growth.
The ﬁgure also shows that the increase in idiosyncratic risk has a large impact on
the desired level of net foreign assets in the long run—and thus on the direction
of capital ﬂows during the transition. If the level of idiosyncratic risk remains the
same, the pickup in growth lowers the long-run level of foreign assets from -23.9
percent to -135.6 percent of GDP, so that the higher growth rate is associated
with a larger volume of capital inﬂows, both in the transition and in the long
17With G =1 .04 and  =0 .025, our benchmark calibration is the average of the pre-transition and post-
transition regimes.
18run. By contrast, if the level of idiosyncratic risk increases with growth, the
long-run level of foreign assets increases to 69.7 percent of GDP, implying that
higher growth is associated with capital outﬂows.
18 Thus, small changes in the
level of idiosyncratic risk have a ﬁrst-order impact on the volume and direction
of capital ﬂows and may help explain the puzzling correlation between economic
growth and capital ﬂows that is found in the data.
19
4.1.2 Steady States
We now look at what the model says about the steady-state correlation between
growth and capital ﬂows, rather than the correlation for a given country over
time. The country exports capital if its net foreign asset position is positive
(N N N>0), since the level of its net foreign assets increases over time with output.
The ratio of capital outﬂows to output is given by,
N N Nt −N N Nt−1
P P P t
=
N N N
P P P
 
1 −
1
ΞG
 
. (32)
On the one hand, with faster growth the target value of (N N N/P P P) will be smaller.
On the other hand, a country that grows faster must export more capital to
maintain a constant ratio of foreign assets to GDP (so the term in parentheses in
(32) becomes larger).
20 Even if both initial and ﬁnal values of (N N N/P P P) are positive,
the sign of the relation between growth and net capital ﬂows is theoretically
ambiguous.
We calibrate the model with the pre-transition regime parameter values (i.e.
with G =1 .02 and   =0 .02). Figure 6 shows how the right-hand side of (32)
varies with G under two diﬀerent assumptions. The line “constant risk” shows the
ratio of capital outﬂows to GDP if the only variable that changes is the growth
rate. The line “increasing risk” is based on the assumption that the idiosyncratic
risk increases linearly by 0.25 percent for every additional percent of growth.
Points A, B, and C respectively correspond to the benchmark calibration, the
pre-transition regime and the post-transition regime of the previous section.
Two ﬁndings stand out. First, if idiosyncratic risk does not increase with
growth, the ratio of capital outﬂows to GDP is decreasing with growth. Second,
18The pattern shown in ﬁgure 5 is robust to plausible changes in the values of the parameters. For example,
higher growth remains associated with capital outﬂows if the post-transition growth rate is 8 percent instead of
6 percent (keeping a equal to 3 percent) or if the unemployment probability increases to 2.5 percent instead
of 3 percent (keeping the post-transition growth rate equal to 6 percent).
19A similar point is made by Sandri (2008). In Sandri’s model, the increase in the growth rate and in the
level of idiosyncratic risk are jointly determined by the emergence of a class of entrepreneurs who invest in a
risky technology, but must provide for the possibility of bankruptcy by putting aside riskless assets outside of
their entrepreneurial activity.
20See Carroll (2000) for further discussion of the possibility for precautionary models to generate a positive
causality from growth to saving.
19if idiosyncratic risk increases with growth as we have speciﬁed, the ratio of
capital outﬂows to output is positive, i.e., an increase in growth always causes
the economy to export more capital (even if it grows at 10 percent per year). The
relationship between the ratio of capital outﬂows to GDP and the growth rate is
non-monotonic. Capital outﬂows increase (as a share of GDP) with the growth
rate if the latter is lower than 6 percent. For higher levels of the growth rate the
sign of the relationship is reversed.
4.2 Global Imbalances
The main counterpart for the accumulation of net foreign assets by developing
countries has been the accumulation of net foreign liabilities by the United States.
In a famous 2005 speech, Ben Bernanke hypothesized that the then-prevailing low
level of world interest rates and high level of U.S. current account deﬁcits could be
due in part to this global “savings glut” (Bernanke (2005)). The U.S. authorities
subsequently argued that an orderly resolution of global ﬁnancial imbalances
required the saving rate of Asian emerging market countries, most notably China,
to decrease to more normal levels.
21
The small economy assumption is not appropriate for studying such large
events. We therefore present in this section a two-country general equilibrium
version of the model that can be used instead. The model is solved only for the
steady state equilibria, which means that we will be interested in the long-term
consequences of particular policy experiments. We ﬁrst look at a closed-economy
version of the model.
4.2.1 Closed Economy
We assume that the global economy that has the same structure as the small
open economy that we have considered so far.Global net foreign assets are equal
to zero, which using (22) implies
1
R
 
1+
 ΞG
ΞG −  D(βR)1/ρ
 
S S Se
P P P
=
α
R −  
. (33)
The left-hand side is the desired global stock of wealth whereas the right-hand side
is the desired global stock of capital. The equality between the two endogenizes
the steady-state interest rate. We assume that the desired stock of wealth comes
from the model with stakes and social insurance, i.e., it is given by (30).
Figure 7 shows how the desired stocks of saving and of capital vary with the
interest rate for the benchmark calibration and three diﬀerent levels of social
21The 2008-09 global ﬁnancial crisis added a further motivation for the same policy prescription: The
maintenance of global aggregate demand.
20insurance ς =0 ,1 and 2.
22 The desired level of capital is decreasing with the
interest rate whereas the desired level of wealth is increasing with the interest
rate. Note that the desired level of capital is much more sensitive to the interest
rate than the desired level of wealth. This implies that the decrease in desired
wealth generated by higher social insurance is reﬂected almost one for one in a
lower level of capital – an interesting point because it illustrates the importance
of incorporating the precautionary motive in the model.
4.2.2 Long-term Impact of Reducing Global Imbalances
This section uses a two-country version of our model to investigate the long-run
impact of a decrease in the desired stock of wealth outside of the United States.
We consider a two-country world, where each country has the same structure
as before. The two countries (denoted by h and f, respectively for “home” and
“foreign”) are identical, except for their sizes and their levels of social insurance
(ςh and ςf). The shares of countries h and f in world output are respectively
denoted by ωh and ωf. The two countries have the same growth rate, so that
there is a well-deﬁned balanced growth path in which each country maintains a
constant share of global output.
The condition that global foreign assets must be equal to zero,
N N Nh +N N Nf =0 ,
endogenizes the global interest rate R. Normalizing by the countries’ GDP, this
equation can be rewritten,
ωh
N N Nh
P P P h
+ ωf
N N Nf
P P P f
=0 ,
where for each country, N N N/P P P is given by (22), with S S Se/P P P =( 1− α)` ˇ s(ς).
We consider the following experiment. Assume that the share of the home
country in total GDP is 20 percent (ωh =0 .2 and ωf =0 .8), which is the right
order of magnitude for the United States. Assume that ςh >ς f, implying that
the home country has net liabilities because the desired ratio of wealth to GDP
is lower at home than in the rest of the world. We assume the values ςh =1 .5
and ςf =0 .75, which implies R =1 .042, N N Nh/P P P h = −0.512 and N N Nf/P P P f =0 .128
(the values of the other parameters remaining as in Table 1). The ratio of U.S.
liabilities to GDP is higher than the current level (which is closer to 25 percent),
but not implausible looking forward if the U.S. were to continue to maintain large
current account deﬁcits.
22We would obtain similar results by varying parameters other than the level of social insurance. We choose
social insurance (as opposed to, say, taste parameters such as the level of risk aversion) because it is a policy
variable that can be changed.
21We then consider what would happen if global imbalances were resorbed as a
consequence of a reduction in the desired wealth-to-income ratio in the rest of
the world; this is achieved by increasing ςf to the home level (from 0.75 to 1.5).
Figure 8 shows the long-run response of the foreign assets and liabilities, as well
as the global real interest rate and real wage (normalized by productivity). As
expected, the net foreign assets of the home and foreign countries go to zero as
the two countries converge to the same ratio of wealth to GDP. However, this
convergence is achieved mainly by a decrease in global capital, which is reﬂected
in an increase in the real interest rate (from 4.2 to 5.6 percent), and a decrease
in the normalized real wage (by 5.4 percent).
The decrease in the desired foreign level of wealth thus has a large negative
impact on the real wage. The welfare eﬀect is unambiguously negative for
the home country. The long-run welfare impact is also negative in the foreign
country, although not necessarily during the transition, as the generations that
are alive at the time of the increase in social insurance beneﬁt from consuming
the accumulated net foreign assets. The home country enjoys an export boom
during the transition, but this is associated with lower investment rather than
higher output.
The intuition should be clear from the analysis of the closed economy in the
previous section. The decrease in the desired level of foreign wealth raises the
world interest rate, with little impact on the level of home wealth. Thus, it is
reﬂected mainly in a decrease in the ratio of capital to output, which depresses
the real wage.
5 Conclusion
This paper has presented a tractable model of the net foreign assets of a small
open economy. The desired level of domestic wealth was endogenized as the
optimal level of precautionary wealth against an idiosyncratic risk. We presented
two applications of the model. The ﬁrst concerned the relationship between
economic development and capital ﬂows. The second concerned the long-run
global implications of reducing global imbalances by reducing the desired stock
of saving outside of the United States.
Although very stylized, the model is able to predict plausible orders of mag-
nitude for the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP. This being said, there are
several dimensions in which the model could be made more realistic, probably
at the expense of tractability. In particular, it would be interesting to know
the exchange rate implications of a multi-goods extension of the model. (We
anticipate that such an extension would show that a developing country that
22increases its desired level of foreign assets following economic liberalization will
see a depreciation of its real exchange rate.) It would be also interesting to look
at the impact of changes in the desired level of wealth on the price of assets other
than currencies.
Our paper also has potential implications for future empirical work. To the
best of our knowledge, the empirical literature has not looked at the impact of
idiosyncratic risk and social insurance on net foreign assets in the context of a
large sample of countries. The available evidence is anecdotal or focused on one
country (e.g., Chamon and Prasad (2008)), or it is about ﬁnancial development
rather than social insurance (Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2007)). It would
be interesting to see if the predictions of our framework for net foreign assets can
be tested with the available data (although we have not been able to ﬁnd a cross-
country database on social insurance that could be used for such an empirical
study).
23A Appendix
A.1 Key Model Parameters and Variables
We provide the following tables to aid the reader in keeping track of our notation.
Parameter Deﬁnition
α Capital’s share in the Cobb-Douglas Production Function
  Depreciation Factor (Proportion Remaining After Depreciation)
Ξ Population Growth Factor
G Aggregate Productivity Growth Factor
R Riskfree Interest Factor
β Time Preference Factor
ρ Coeﬃcient of Relative Risk Aversion
ς Severance Payment (In Years Of Income) Paid At Unemployment
X Individual (eXperience-based) Productivity Growth
ωi Weight (Share) Of Country i in World Income
  Probability Of Employed Worker Becoming Unemployed
D Probability of Death
τ Tax Rate
χ ‘Stake’ In Version Of Model With Stakes
ξ Individual’s Employment Status (1 if Employed; 0 if Not)
Some combinations of the parameters above are used as convenient shorthand:
Constant Deﬁnition
    ≡ 1 −   Period Probability of Employed Worker Remaining Employed
  D ≡ 1 − D Probability of Survival (Not Dying)
 τ ≡ 1 − τ Proportion of Income Left After Taxation
Λ ≡  X
Ξ Annual Shrinkage of Old Generations’ Share in L L L
κu ≡ 1 −
(βR)1/ρ
R/ D Marginal Propensity to Consume for Unemployed Consumer
Γ ≡ GX Labor Income Growth For Continuing-Employed Individual
Þ Þ ÞΓ ≡
(βR)1/ρ
Γ Growth Patience Factor
24Variable Deﬁnition
C Consumption
E Employed Population
I Investment
K Physical Capital Stock
L Labor Supply
  Individual labor productivity per employed worker
N Net Foreign Assets
P GDP (‘Production’)
S Total Wealth (Foreign and Domestic)
U Unemployed Population
Typeface Meaning
Bold Level of a Variable
Plain Ratio of The Variable To GDP or Labor Income
Uppercase Aggregate Variable
Lowercase Household-Level (Idiosyncratic) Variable
A.2 National Accounting
The aggregate budget constraint of residents can be written,
S S St+1
R
+C C Ct = S S St +( 1− α)P P P t.
Using (2) this equation can be rewritten as,
C C Ct +I I It +( N N Nt − RN N Nt−1)=P P P t,
where I I It = K K Kt+1− K K Kt is domestic investment, and N N Nt is given by (5). Using the
GDP identity (domestic output is either consumed, invested or exported), and
deﬁning X X X as net exports, we have
C C Ct +I I It +X X Xt = P P P t,
it follows that net exports are equal to X X Xt = N N Nt − RN N Nt−1. By deﬁnition, the
current account balance is equal to net exports plus the income on net foreign
assets,
Current Accountt ≡ X X Xt +( R − 1)N N Nt−1,
from which we can derive the balance-of-payments equation,
Current Accountt = N N Nt −N N Nt−1.
The current account balance is equal to the increase in the country’s net foreign
asset position, i.e., the volume of capital outﬂows in period t.
25A.3 The Consumption-Saving Problem of the Unemployed
An insurance company al aBlanchard (1985) provides each newly unemployed
worker with an annuity, i.e., a consumption path that is conditional on the
individual staying alive. The annuity contract maximizes the welfare of the
individual conditional on the expected present value of his consumption being
equal to his wealth. For a worker becoming unemployed at t it solves the problem,
max
+∞  
n=0
β
n
  D
nu(c c c
u
t+n)
subject to
+∞  
n=0
R
−n
  D
nc c c
u
t+n = s s s
u
t.
The Euler equation is,
c c c
u
t+n =( βR)
n/ρc c c
u
t.
Using this expression to substitute out c c cu
t+n from the expected present value
constraint then gives,
s s s
u
t =
+∞  
n=0
R
−n
  D
nc c c
u
t+n =
c c cu
t
κu.
A.4 Saddle-Point Stability
We ﬁrst characterize the iso-se and iso-ce loci in the space (se,c e). Equation (13)
implies that the iso-se locus is a line deﬁned by,
c
e =1+
 
1 −
Γ
R
 
s
e.
Similarly, setting ce
t+1 = ce
t in equation (14) gives the following equation for the
iso-ce locus,
c
e =
 
1+
Γ
κuR
 
1+
Þ Þ Þ
−ρ
Γ − 1
 
 −1/ρ −1
(1 + s
e).
The iso-ce locus is an upward-sloping line which intersects the ce-axis below the
iso-se line. The iso-ce line and the iso-se lines intersect in the positive quadrant
(as indicated on Figure 1) if and only if ˇ s>0. This is true because,
26Γ
R
− 1+κ
u
 
1+
Þ Þ Þ
−ρ
Γ − 1
 
 1/ρ
>
Γ
R
− 1+κ
u =
1
R
 
Γ − (Rβ)
1/ρ 
> 0,
where the last inequality follows from the growth impatience condition (11).
Using equation (13), it is straightforward to see that se increases (decreases)
if and only if (se,c e) is below (above) the iso-se line. Equation (14) implies that
ce
t+1 is decreasing with se
t. Therefore, ce decreases if and only if (se,c e) is in the
region to the right of the iso-ce locus. This is also the region below the locus,
because this locus is upward-sloping. Thus, the phase diagram is as it is shown
on Figure 1, and the dynamics for the pair (se
t,c e
t) are saddle-point stable.
A.5 Aggregating Individual Wealths
Here we derive equation (19). The aggregate wealth of employed workers is given
by,
S S S
e
t =
+∞  
n=0
et,t−ns s s
e
t,t−n
where et,t−n is the number of employed workers born in period t−n,a n ds s se
t,t−n =
se
t,t−nWt n is the level of wealth held by the representative worker in the generation
born at t − n. Using et,t−n =Ξ t−n   n and  n = Xn 0 we have
S S S
e
t =Ξ
t 0Wt
+∞  
n=0
Λ
ns
e
t,t−n,
with Λ=   X/Ξ. Using P P P t = WtL L Lt/(1 − α) the ratio of foreign assets to output
can be written
S S Se
t
P P P t
=( 1− α)
Ξt 0
L L Lt
+∞  
n=0
Λ
ns
e
t,t−n. (34)
Each individual has a labor endowment that increases at rate X until he becomes
unemployed. Thus, in period t the generation born at t−n supplies a quantity of
labor equal to the number of workers from this generation who are still employed
at t, times the labor supply per worker,
L L Lt,t−n =Ξ
t−n
   
n 0X
n =Ξ
tΛ
n 0.
Total labor supply, thus, is given by,
L L Lt =
+∞  
n=0
L L Lt,t−n =Ξ
t
+∞  
n=0
Λ
n 0 =Ξ
t  0
1 − Λ
. (35)
27Using this expression to substitute out L L Lt from equation (34) then gives equation
(19).
A.6 Model with Stakes
We add to the model a transfer that ensures that the workers have the same
wealth-to-income ratio at all times. More precisely, the transfer ensures that if
all workers have the same ratio se in period t, then this is also true in period
t +1 . So one simply needs to assume that all workers had the same ratio se at
some point in the past for this to be true in all periods. This would be the case,
for example, if the country started with a ﬁrst generation at some distant period
in the past.
The period-t budget constraint of an individual is
s s st+1
R
+c c ct + χt = s s st + ξt tWt,
where χt is a lump-sum transfer. The transfer puts newborn individuals at the
same net wealth-to-income ratio as the rest of the population. For the other
workers the transfer is a lump-sum tax that is proportional to their generation’s
wealth. For an employed worker born at t − n the tax is,
χt = τs
e
t 0X
nWt,
whereas for a new-born worker the transfer is given by,
χt = −
≡1−τ     
 τs
e
t 0Wt.
In all periods of a worker’s life, thus, the normalized budget constraint is given
by,
s
e
t+1 = R/Γ(  τs
e
t − c
e
t +1 ), (36)
which generalizes (13). Equation (15) remains valid,
ˇ ˇ c = κ
u
 
1+
Þ Þ Þ
−ρ
Γ − 1
 
 1/ρ
ˇ ˇ s,
whereas (16) is replaced by
(Γ/R − τ) ˇ ˇ s =1− ˇ ˇ c.
Eliminating ˇ ˇ c between these two equations then gives the following expression for
the target wealth-to-income ratio,
ˇ ˇ s =
 
Γ
R
− τ + κ
u
 
1+
Þ Þ Þ
−ρ
Γ − 1
 
 1/ρ −1
. (37)
28The equilibrium level of τ results from the following equality,
Ξ
t
 τs
e
t 0Wt = τs
e
tWtL L Lt.
The left-hand side is the ﬂow of payment that is required to endow each newborn
individual with the same ratio of after-tax net wealth to income as the rest of
the population. The right-hand side is the proceeds of the tax on the employed
workers. Using (35) to substitute outL L Lt, this equation simpliﬁes to τ = τ/(1−Λ),
which implies
τ =
1 − Λ
2 − Λ
. (38)
Using this expression to substitute out τ from (37) gives (25).
A.7 The Ramsey Model
The Ramsey model corresponds to the particular case where there is one repre-
sentative inﬁnitely-lived worker (Ξ=1and   =0 ). In this case income growth
is the same at the individual level and at the aggregate level. We can assume,
without loss of generality, that X =1 ,s ot h a tΓ=G.
The individual’s problem at time 0 is to maximize,
+∞  
t=0
β
tu(c c ct),
subject to the budget constraint,
s s st+1
R
+c c ct = s s st +( 1− α)p p pt,
where p p pt = Gtp p p0 is the country’s output. For the worker’s discounted intertem-
poral income to be ﬁnite we must assume G < R.
Iterating on the budget constraint and using c c ct =( βR)t/ρc c c0 (from the Euler
equation) and p p pt = Gtp p p0 to substitute out consumption and output, we have
s s st =
t−1  
n=0
R
t−n(1 − α)p p pn −
t−1  
n=0
R
t−nc c cn + R
ts s s0,
=( 1 − α)p p p0
Rt − Gt
1 − G/R
−c c c0
Rt − (βR)t/ρ
1 − (βR)1/ρ/R
+ R
ts s s0.
For the transversality condition to be satisﬁed, c c c0 must be such that the terms
in Rt cancel out in the expression above. Using this property to substitute out
c c c0, the expression for s s st simpliﬁes to,
s s st =( 1− α)p p p0
(βR)t/ρ − Gt
1 − G/R
+s s s0(βR)
t/ρ.
29The limiting wealth-to-output ratio is given by,
lim
t→+∞
s s st
p p pt
= lim
t→+∞
1 − α
Gt
(βR)t/ρ − Gt
1 − G/R
+
s s s0
p p p0
(βR)t/ρ
Gt ,
= lim
t→+∞
(1 − α)
Þ Þ Þ
t
Γ − 1
1 − G/R
+
s s s0
p p p0
Þ Þ Þ
t
Γ
= −
1 − α
1 − G/R
.
A.8 Social Insurance
Here we derive equation (29). The worker’s normalized budget constraint is still
given by (36), taking into account that the wage is taxed at rate τw to pay for
the unemployment beneﬁts,
s
e
t+1 =( R/Γ)( τs
e
t − c
e
t + τw). (39)
Equation (12) still applies, with cu
t+1 = κu(se
t+1 + ς). Setting se
t+1 = se
t = ` ˇ s and
ce
t+1 = ce
t = ` ˇ c in equations (12)a n d( 39) we obtain
` ˇ c = κ
u
 
1+
Þ Þ Þ
−1/ρ
Γ − 1
 
 1/ρ
(` ˇ s + ς),
` ˇ s(Γ/R − τ)= τw − ` ˇ c.
Eliminating ` ˇ c between these equations gives,
` ˇ s =
 
 τw − κ
u
 
1+
Þ Þ Þ
−ρ
Γ − 1
 
 1/ρ
ς
 
ˇ ˇ s, (40)
where ˇ ˇ s is given by equation (25). The tax rate τw must satisfy,
τwL L LtWt =  Et−1X ςWt.
The left-hand-side is the ﬂow of tax receipts at time t. The right-hand-side is the
amount needed to ﬁnance the transfer to the newly unemployed workers. Using
  = L L Lt/Et and Et/Et−1 =Ξone has,
τw =
 X
Ξ
ς.
Using this expression and (38) to substitute out τw from equation (40) gives
equation (29).
30A.9 Transition Dynamics
Normalizing  0 to 1, the equation for the dynamics of aggregate labor supply is,
L L Lt =    XL L Lt−1 +Ξ
t,
implying that in steady state,
L L Lt =
Ξt+1
Ξ −   X
.
Up until period 0 (inclusive), the economy is in a steady growth path with G = Gb
and   =  b,s ot h a t
L L L0 =
Ξ
Ξ −   bX
.
In period 0 it is announced that from period 1 onwards the productivity growth
rate and the ﬂow probability of unemployment jump to higher levels, Ga and  a.
Starting from L L L0, the dynamics of labor supply are given by,
L L Lt =    aXL L Lt−1 +Ξ
t,
from which it is possible to compute the whole path (L L Lt)t≤0, as well as the gross
rate of growth in labor supply, L L Lt/L L Lt−1. It follows from (1)a n d( 2) that output
grows at the same rate as ztL L Lt. Hence the gross rate of output growth, גt ≡
P P P t/P P P t−1, is given by
גt = GaL L Lt/L L Lt−1
for t ≥ 1. Using this expression we can compute the whole path (גt)t≥1.
We now come to the ratios of net foreign assets and capital outﬂows to GDP,
N N Nt/P P P t and (N N Nt −N N Nt−1)/P P P t. Using the deﬁnition of N N N equation (5), we have
N N Nt
P P P t
= גt+1
 
(1 − α)st+1
R
−
K K K
P P P
 
,
N N Nt −N N Nt−1
P P P t
=
1 − α
R
(גt+1st+1 − st) − (גt+1 − 1)
K K K
P P P
,
where st = se
t + su
t is the ratio of aggregate wealth to aggregate labor income.
The path for se
t is the individual convergence path for the model with stakes,
where the initial condition se
0 is given by (25) with G = Gb and   =  b.T h i s
gives us the whole path (se
t)t≤0. As for su
t, the initial condition can be derived
from equation (21),
s
u
0 =
 bΞGb
ΞGb −  Db(βR)1/ρs
e
0.
The path for su
t can then be derived from equation (20), which can be rewritten
31in normalized form,
s
u
t+1 =
  Da(βR)1/ρ
גt+1
s
u
t +  as
e
t+1.
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